In spite of significant research efforts, argument technologies do not seem poised to scale up as much as most commentators would hope or even predict. In this paper, I discuss what obstacles bar the way to more widespread success of argument technologies and venture some suggestions on how to circumvent such difficulties: doing so will require a significant shift in how this research area is typically understood and practiced. I begin by exploring a much broader yet closely related question: To what extent are people natively good at arguing? This issue has always been central to philosophical reflection and it has become even more urgent nowadays, with the explosion of persuasive technologies and unprecedented opportunities for large-scale social influence. The answer hinges on what aspect of argumentation is taken under consideration: evidence suggests that people are relatively bad at analyzing the structure of arguments, especially when these are presented out of context and in abstract terms; in contrast, data show that even laymen tend to excel in the interactive practice of argumentation, in particular when motivation is high and something significant is at stake. Unfortunately, current argument technologies are more closely tailored to the former type of activity than to the latter, which is the main reason behind their relative lack of success with the general public. Changing this state of affair will require a commitment to ecological argument technologies: that is, technologies designed to support real-time, engaging and meaningful argumentative interactions performed by laypeople in their ordinary life, instead of catering to the highly specific needs of a minority of niche users (typically, argumentation scholars).
A Plea for Ecological Argument Technologies
Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht , Paesi Bassi
Philosophy & technology (Print) 30 (2017): 209–238. doi:10.1007/s13347-016-0222-6
info:cnr-pdr/source/autori:Paglieri, Fabio/titolo:A Plea for Ecological Argument Technologies/doi:10.1007/s13347-016-0222-6/rivista:Philosophy & technology (Print)/anno:2017/pagina_da:209/pagina_a:238/intervallo_pagine:209–238/volume:30