This paper summarizes the basic assumptions of a decision theoretic approach to argumentation, as well as some preliminary empirical findings based on that view. The relative neglect for decision making in argumentation theory is discussed, and the approach is defended against the charge of being merely descriptive. In contrast, it is shown that considering arguments as the product of decisions brings into play various normative models of rational choice. This presents argumentation theory with a novel challenge: how to reconcile strategic rationality with other normative constraints, such as inferential validity and dialectical appropriateness? It is suggested that strategic considerations should be included, rather than excluded, from the evaluation of argument quality, and this position is put in contact with the growing interest for virtue theory in argumentation studies.
On the rationality of argumentative decisions
Contributo in volume
College Publications Ltd, London, GBR
Argument technologies: Theory, analysis, and applications, edited by Bex F., Grasso F., Green N., Paglieri F., Reed C., pp. 35–47. London: College Publications Ltd, 2017
info:cnr-pdr/source/autori:Paglieri F./titolo:On the rationality of argumentative decisions/titolo_volume:Argument technologies: Theory, analysis, and applications/curatori_volume:Bex F., Grasso F., Green N., Paglieri F., Reed C./editore: