Self-deception looks mysterious and paradoxical because it doesn't seem possible to deceive yourself and be deceived. As the deceiver you have to know that you are hiding something from someone. But as the deceived you cannot know what is hidden, or else you are not deceived. In this work, we will argue that deceiving oneself is not self-contradictory: self-deception involves believing something you are motivated to believe, but the motivation works indirectly, specifically by getting you to make a biased case for the belief you wish to have. We will also address the differences between a self-deceiver and a hypocrite, and the moral implications of self-deception.
On knowing self-deception
Blackwell,, Oxford , Regno Unito
Journal for the theory of social behaviour (Print) 19 (1989): 213–227. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.1989.tb00145.x
info:cnr-pdr/source/autori:Silver, Maury; Sabini, John; Miceli, Maria/titolo:On knowing self-deception/doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.1989.tb00145.x/rivista:Journal for the theory of social behaviour (Print)/anno:1989/pagina_da:213/pagina_a:227/intervallo_pagine