In an unpredictable, heterogeneous world, intelligent agents depend on accurate social information; reputation, among the preeminent artifacts to transmit social evaluations, has been receiving growing attention by social scientists. A realistic description of reputation must include inaccurate information; in this paper, based on the distinction between image (agents' believed evaluation of a target) and reputation (circulating evaluation, without reference to the evaluation source), we model the spreading of information in a simple market with the presence of liars and the possibility of retaliation. While fear of retaliation inhibits the spreading of image, the detached character of reputation can be a cause of inaccuracy; The two forces could balance in different settings. In a set of simulations, with agents using the Repage platform for management of image and reputation, we compare the usage of image alone with the usage of both image and reputation. Reputation is shown to be preferable over image to allow for faster discover of scarce good sellers.
Beyond Accuracy. Reputation for Partner selection with Lies and Retaliation
Springer, Berlin , Germania
Lecture notes in computer science 5003 (2008): 128–140. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70916-9_10
info:cnr-pdr/source/autori:Pinyol, I., Paolucci, M., Sabater-Mir, J., & Conte, R./titolo:Beyond Accuracy. Reputation for Partner selection with Lies and Retaliation/doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70916-9_10/rivista:Lecture notes in computer science/anno:2008/pagin