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> Trust theory > The socio-cognitive model
of trust
We carefully analyse the ingredients
necessary to have the mental state of trust, i.e. the components and sources
of that estimated "subjective probability" about a partner's
behaviour identified by Gambetta in his classic theory. We specify which
beliefs and which goals characterise X's trust in another agent Y. Trust is a mental attitude
One trusts another only relatively to a goal, i.e. for something he wants to achieve, that he desires.
X is the relying agent, who feels trust; it is a cognitive agent endowed with internal explicit goals and beliefs; Y is the agent or entity which is trusted. Y is not necessarily a cognitive agent.
Since Y's action is useful to X, and X is relying on it, this means that X is "delegating" some action/goal in his own plan to Y. This is the strict relation between trust and reliance or delegation. Basic beliefs in trust In the most elementary case of trust and delegation, we have to consider that X has a goal G and tries to achieve it by using Y. Then X has some specific beliefs:
These are the two prototypical components of trust as an attitude towards Y. They are the real cognitive kernel of trust. Trust and reliance These kernel ingredients are not enough for arriving to a delegation or a reliance disposition. At least a third belief is necessary for this:
These beliefs (plus the goal G) define X's "trust in Y" in delegation. However, another crucial belief arises in X's mental state, supported and implied by the previous ones:
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